Title | Quality standards versus nutritional taxes: Health welfare impacts with strategic firms |
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Paper authors | |
Journal | Journal of Health Economics |
journal-issue | Volume 50, December 2016, Pages 268-285 |
Date | May 27 2016 |
Description | The goal of this paper is to better understand firms' strategic reactions to nutritional policies targeting food quality improvements and to derive optimal policies. We propose a model of product differentiation, taking into account the taste and health characteristics of products. We study how two firms react to alternative policies: an MQS policy, linear taxation of the two goods on the market, and taxation of the lowquality good. The MQS and the taxation of the low-quality product are the preferred options by a social planner. If taste is moderately important, the MQS policy is chosen by a populist and a paternalist social planner. If taste is a major component of choice, the populist planner chooses to tax the low-quality product whereas the paternalist planner prefers the MQS policy. Finally, for a paternalist social planner, an MQS-based policy always allows for higher levels of welfare than an information policy alone. |
Category | Journal articles |
URL | |
Corresponding Author(s) | Vincent Réquillart |
Authors at SUSFANS | |
Work package | |
JEL Code | I18, L13, Q18 |
Keywords | taxation, MQS, product di erentiation, strategic pricing, nutritional policy |